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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN DESEGREGATION
I. THE "SEPARATE BUT EQUAL" DOCTRINE-A HISTORY
The black man in the United States has had a long difficult struggle
in his effort to achieve legal equality. From Plessy v. Ferguson,' through
the Desegration Cases2 up to Green v. County School Board of New Kent
County,3 he has been continually engaged in legal turmoil involving his
fourteenth amendment rights.
Plessy was the first case of stature to come before the Supreme Court
dealing with the constitutionality of segregation laws under the four-
teenth amendment. The Court declared that the fourteenth amend-
ment was not designed to abolish discrimination based on color.4 It held
that the fourteenth amendment was not intended to abolish racial segre-
gation, that racial segregation does not imply the inferiority of the Negro
and that segregation may be reasonable if equal facilities are provided.
But the reasoning of the Court seemed to be inapposite to the policy
behind the fourteenth amendment, which is to establish the Negro as a
citizen and to protect him in the fall enjoyment of his rights. With
Plessy, the Court adopted the "separate but equal" doctrine, holding that
if there exists the equality of privilege which the laws give to segregated
groups, then the races may be separated and constitutional invalidity
does not arise from the mere fact of separation.5
In the late 1940's the cases began approaching the proposition that
segregation was discrimination per se. In Mendez v. Westminister School
District,6 the court held that equal protection of the laws pertaining to the
public school system in California was not provided by furnishing the
same facilities in separate schools and that schools must be open to all
children regardless of Tace. The court in effect said that by depriving
minority group children of social interaction and social equality, that
they were deprived of equal protection.
In 1950, the Supreme Court decided two important cases which further
undermined the "separate but equal" doctrine by ruling that in certain
circumstances, segregated treatment would not be equal treatment.
In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents,7 it was held to be a denial of
equal protection to admit a Negro applicant to an all-white graduate
1163 U.S. 537 (1896).
2 The series of desegregation cases that came from the Supreme Court in 1954, the most
famous of which is Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
4 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896).
51d. at 544.
8 64 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Cal. 1946).
7339 U.S. 637 (1950).
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school and keep him segregated within that school." The Court pointed
out that under these conditions, a student would be receiving unequal
treatment in that he would be deprived of the necessary association with
his fellow students. These restrictions were said to impair McLaurin's
ability to study and to get along with other students in the school and
thereby handicap him in learning his profession.9 In Sweatt v. Painter,0
a Negro was refused admission to the all-white University of Texas Law
School. His only alternative was to attend a newly organized law school
for Negroes. The Court held that the Negro student had been denied
equal protection of the law and stated that in substance the two law
schools were not substantially equal.
Whether the University of Texas Law School is compared with the orig-
inal or the new law school for Negroes, we cannot find substantial equal-
ity in the educational opportunities offered white and Negro law students
by the State.... [Tjhe University of Texas Law School possesses to a
far greater degree those qualities which are incapable of objective meas-
urement but which make for greatness in a law school."
These two cases demonstrate the application by the courts of the concept
of equality in conjunction with the "separate but equal" doctrine, and they
rendered segregation laws ineffective in the area of graduate education.
II. THE. DESEGREGATION CASES
Four years after the McLaurin decision, the Supreme Court decided
one of the most important and influential cases affecting the fourteenth
amendment since Plessy. The Court in Brown v. Board of Education2
answered the basic question of whether segregation in public schools
solely on the basis of race deprives the Negro child of an equal educa-
tional opportunity.
The suit was initiated on behalf of Negro children in the city of
Topeka, Kansas, seeking to enjoin the enforcement of a Kansas statute
that permitted cities with a population of over 15,000 to maintain sep-
arate school facilities for Negro and white students.'8 The plaintiffs
claimed that they were being denied equal protection of the law under
the fourteenth amendment but were refused relief in the trial court pur-
suant to the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson.
8 McIaurin was not permitted to attend class with his white counterparts nor was he allowed
to dine with them. He was admitted to the school, but then denied equal access to its facilities.
9 339 U.S. 637, 641 (1950).
10 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
1Id. at 633-34. Some of the qualities mentioned by the Court include reputation of the
faculty, the administration, influence of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and
prestige.
12347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13Law of Feb. 13, 1864, Ch. 67, § 4 (1864] LAws oF KAN. 117 (repealed 1957).
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The Supreme Court found that the two races had been equalized with
respect to all ",tangible" factors. The Court looked instead to the effect
of segregation on public education. Public education was considered in
light of its present place in American life to ascertain if segregation was
depriving the Negro children of equal protection. The Court evalu-
ated education as basic to our society and helpful to the individual to
adjust normally to his environment, concluding that education was so
important that the State must make it available to all on equal terms.
The Court took into consideration intangible factors which were not
capable of objective measurement. The Court said: "To separate them
from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race
gererates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community .. .,",
The policy of separating the races was interpreted as denoting the infer-
iority of the Negro race and therefore separate educational facilities were
found to be inherently unequal. The language in Brown indicates that
the Court based its opinion upon the principle of unequal educational
opportunity, even though the application of this principle -required the
Court to assess the total social impact of segregated education.
In 1955 the Court decided Brown I1' and concerned itself with the
question of what type of relief was necessary to commence desegregation,
The Court required that school boards "make a prompt and reasonable
start toward full complaince"'16 with the ruling in Brown I. Once a
start toward desegregation had been made, said Chief Justice Warren
speaking for the Court, additional time would be given if needed to
carry out the ruling effectively.
The burden rests upon the defendants to establish that such time is nec-
essary in the public interest and is consistent with good faith compliance
at the earliest practicable date.17
The district courts were then ordered to take such action as would be
proper to admit all children -to public schools on a racially nondiscrimina-
tory basis and "with all deliberate speed."'"
Brown I and 11 marked the beginning of a new legal and social era.
Many questions were left still unanswered by the desegregation decisions
such as: How quickly was "with all deliberate speed"? What are per-
missible ways of effectuating desegregation? Is desegregation synono-
mous with integration? Do the Brown decisions apply with equal
strength to de facto as well as de jure segregation? These are some of
14347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
IGBrown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
l0 Id. at 300.
17Id.
18 Id at 301.
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the issues that the courts have had to struggle with in the aftermath of the
desegregation decisions.
III. RAMIFICATIONS oF BROWN
Because of the deliberate speed formula, the courts reacted flexibly
with their assessment of local situations and thought in terms not of
immediate but of ultimate compliance. In 1956, the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit accepted a system of allowing a limited number of
transfers of Negro children into white schools.' 9 Except for this token
integration, most schools remained segregated. These cases are represen-
tative of the main lines upon which desegregation moved until the 1960's.
Tokenism was allowed when school boards accepted the principle of
desegregation by the mere physical introduction of a few Negro pupils into
the white schools.
Ingenious Southern school boards continued to invent other illusory
desegregation plans. Two were termed the "freedom-of-choice" plan
and the "free transfer" plan.20 In a now famous Fifth Circuit decision,2 '
the plaintiffs sought to invalidate such a freedom-of-choice plan. The
court adopted the HEW Guidelines22 as the minimum standard that
must be complied with before a freedom-of-choice plan would be ap-
proved. The constitutionality of a plan, under the court's policy, would
depend upon the degree of integration commensurate with the progress
specified by the Guidelines. These Guidelines were to be used as a
standard in deciding whether a plan was achieving integregation rapidly
enough for the school district to qualify for federal aid. The goal was to
bring all boards up to a "substantial" level of integregation.25 In past
cases, courts had utilized the HEW Guidelines in evaluating desegrega-
tion proposals,24 and had often recommended that local school boards
consult them when they draw up desegregation programs.25 Some federal
courts have read the Brown decision as requiring only an end to compul-
sory state assignment of pupils on a racial basis.28 This interpretation has
19 See, Covington v. Edwards, 264 F.2d 780 (4th Cir. 1959); Carson v. Warlick, 238
F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956).
20 Under freedom-of-choice, a child could choose whichever school he wanted to go to with
those students not making a choice assigned to the school previously attended. Under free trans-
fer, the pupil is automatically assigned to a school within attendance zones drawn up by the
Board of Education along geographic boundaries. Then any child may transfer to another school
of his choice if space is available.
21 United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966).
22 Statement of Policies for School Desegregation Plans Under Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 45 C.F.R. § 181 (1967).
231d at § 181.54 (f).
24 e.g., Kemp v. Beasley, 352 F.2d 14 (8th Cir. 1965).
25 e.g., Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, 348 F.2d 729, 730 (5th
Cir. 1965).
20 Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
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been used to legitimize free-choice plans, which result in little actual inte-
gration. However, to read Brown as being satisfied by a plan which
achieves no real change from the effects of state enforced segregation,
renders that decision meaningless. United States v. Jefferson County
Board of Education27 held that the only desegregation plan that meets con-
stitutional standards is one that works. It also said that a district pre-
viously segregated de jure must take affirmative action to integrate its stu-
dent body and that it cannot adopt a plan which results in a continuation
of a dual system of racially identifiable schools. Under this decision,
school authorities could not satisfy constitutional requirements by imple-
menting an ineffective freedom-of-choice plan.
Whether the freedom-of-choice plans constitute adequate compliance
with Brown was the issue determined in the recent Supreme Court case,
Green v. County School Board of New Kent Countys The Supreme
Court analyzed the freedom-of-choice plans using the criteria found in
Brown II. The Court found 'the plan then in effect inadequate because
Negro pupils continued to attend identifiable Negro schools and also
because more effective means were available to eliminate these racially
identifiable schools. In school systems formerly segregated by law,
school boards have an affirmative duty to eliminate racial discrimination
"root and branch."2  The Court said that this duty was not discharged
by offering to Negro and white families the freedom to choose which
school their children will attend unless it leads to a conversion of the ex-
isting dual system to a unitary, nonracial system.Y0
In the companion case of Raney v. Board of Education of the Gould
School District,3' the Court held that district courts should retain jur-
isdiction in cases involving desegregation plans in order to ensure the
constitutionality of that plan. In the other companion case of Monroe
v. Board of Commissioners of the City of Jackson,2 the Court held that
free transfer plans33 were to be tested in the same way as the freedom-of-
choice plans.
The Court did not conclusively deny the use of freedom-of-choice
plans, but it did make it dear that an end to racially identifiable schools
is a primary goal of desegregation and that freedom-of-choice cannot be
employed if more effective means of achieving this goal are available.
In many southern communities, methods more effective than free choice
are available: in Green, a division of Kent County into two geographic
27 372 F.2d 836, 869, 873-76 (5th Cir. 1966).
28 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
'Old. at 438.
oId. at 437-38.
31391 U.S. 443 (1968).
32 391 U.S. 450 (1968).
33id,
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attendance zones might have achieved substantially more integration; in
the companion Monroe case, use of a "feeder system"3 4 appeared to be
an effective method; in other communities the redrawing of attendance
zones, judicious location of new school facilities, or enlargement of old
ones can be effective in promoting an end to racially identifiable
schools.3 5
The basis of the Green decision might have been that this particular
freedom-of-choice plan would not be acceptable because it did not pro-
duce desegregation. Freedom-of-choice plans may not be acceptable
under any conditions because there is really no free choice involved. The
Negro child cannot go to any school that he wishes because political,
social and economic pressures forbid him from choosing to attend a white
school. Even if he finally chooses and attends a white school, he will
not be accepted by the white student body majority. He will be subjected
to undue pressures and made to feel inferior because he is a member
of an unwanted minority. He would have equal access to the school and
the facilities but 'his opportunity for acquiring an education would be
hampered to a great extent because of serious psychological feelings of
inferiority caused by the fact that he would not be accepted by the white
children. If Brown means 'that all children have a right to an equal
educational opportunity, how would this be achieved by the Negro child
attending a school where he was made to feel like a stranger and ignored
by his fellow classmates? But Brown orders the adoption of a non-racial
basis for school population essentially to remove feelings of inferiority
that segregation causes and also to maximize the child's educational op-
portunities. But, for example, would the freedom-of-choice plan accom-
plish this objective? Wouldn't the white students make these unwanted
Negro children still feel inferior? So logically, it seems that the freedom-
of-choice plan was not struck 'down because it was not conducive to
equal educational opportunities, because even if the plan was in effect, the
white students, through their attitudes, would not allow equal educa-
tional opportunity to exist.
The decisions, both Green and Brown, seem to suggest that Negro
children need white class-mates in order to get a first-class education and
that Negroes must learn to co-exist with whites because this is a white
world. The Court seems to say that there are certain aspects of education
that the Negro students cannot get without white classmates. The Court
must have realized that any plans to have whites and blacks attend the
same schools will not achieve present equality. But if the races are made
to attend the same schools, this may be used as a means of eventually
84See discussion note 20, supra.
85The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. REV. 95, 115 (1968). The feeder system
is a commonly used method of pupil assignment whereby pupils graduating at one level are auto-
matically assigned to a specified school at the next higher level. Id. at 115 n.18.
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achieving equality in subsequent generations. If integration will even-
tually achieve equality between the races then the present inequality that
results from integration will have to be accepted as an adequate means to
the ultimate goal of integration. This waiting period will be acceptable
only if the assumption that integration does advance the Negro by help-
ing him absorb white values and thus to lessen his inferiority has va-
lidity.
Recently another problem area has arisen in that the black students
have demanded separate facilities in dormitories at universities and school
decentralization by letting Negro teachers teach in Negro schools that
are managed by a Negro administration. In these situations, separate but
equal facilities are being demanded by, not forced upon, the minority.
The Negro is asking for separation, not integration. Is the Negro de-
manding separate but equal facilities to the disadvantage of the white
child? It may be argued that equal educational opportunity for -both
races can be achieved only by integration and therefore, if the Negro is
accorded separate facilities this results in a denial of equal protection of
the laws to the white children. But do white children need Negroes in
their schools to achieve an equal education? Since white children are in
the majority race and are accepted in this society, it is possible for them to
receive equal educational opportunity without having Negro children in
their schools. But this situation will only prolong the acceptance of the
Negro in the white American society. The Negro will still be considered
inferior and will not be able to absorb those aspects of American life
that he would come into contact with if he had the association of white
classmates. By demanding and receiving separate schools, he will not be
receiving an equal educational opportunity.
If the State has a duty to see that every child has a chance for an
equal education, then does it have a duty to see to it that all schools are
integrated? If whites cannot have separate but equal facilities and
blacks cannot have separate but equal facilities, then this leads to a
school system that cannot be separate; in must be integrated. To insure
that the Negro child will eventually rid 'himself of feelings of inferiority
and be accepted in American society, he must attend an integrated school.
In plans such as freedom-of-choice, the burden of integrating the schools
is placed upon the child and his parents, while it should be the responsi-
bility of the State to insure that each child is accorded equal treatment.
If the State has the burden of running the school system, then it must also
offer equal educational opportunity to all. The freedom-of-choice plans
do not provide for this. There is no free choice in the plans, the bur-
dens are placed upon the parents and children and not on the school
boards. No integration is achieved, therefore, there is no resulting equal
educational opportunity. Clearly the plans are not in accordance with
1969]
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Brown and only integration that is fostered by State action can possibly
correct the conditions which the Brown decision hoped to alleviate.
But Green does not address itself to the problem of the de facto seg-
regation of the North. The failure of the Court to delve into the con-
cept of equal educational opportunity and its understanding of the rela-
tionship between equality and integration will prolong the uncertainty of
the constitutional status of free choice plans and of northern de facto
segregation. The Court refused to comment on whether the separate
education of the races in the North might be violative of the fourteenth
amendment. The Court also left unsolved the problem of a minimum
acceptable rate of integration or the method of detemining when inte-
gration is reached when employing various methods to desegregate the
schools. These questions are confronting many Northern courts and the
answers have been varied.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE DESEGREGATION CASES ON DE
FAcTo SEGREGATION - AN AFFIRMATnVE DUTY To
INTEGRATE?
In the Northern states, there are no overt school policies that prohibit
Negro and white children from attending the same school. De facto
segregation is evidenced by a very high proportion of Negro children
attending some schools and relatively few Negroes attending others. But
this separation between blacks and whites takes place without the com-
pulsion of state law or a school board policy requiring separation. This
apparent absence of state action is important because the equal protection
clause is directed against state action and because psychological harm
emanating from segregated education, as in Brown, is indicated to be
greater when officially imposed.
De facto segregation is caused many times by the neighborhood
school policy. This policy uses attendance zones drawn by the school
board around each school in the system. Each child in the zone is then
required to attend the school within 'his neighborhood and transfers are
prohibited. This system allows the board to anticipate the enrollment
of each school in advance, so that requirements may be planned for be-
fore 'the period arrives. But since minorities tend to reside in the same
areas, the schools in these areas become racially imbalanced. The ration-
ale of the neighborhood school plan is that a child's education should be
a part of his total community life."" It is in the context of the neighbor-
hood school plan - that produces de facto segregation - that the
constitutionality of racially imbalanced schools has been questioned.
Dissatisfaction with the neighborhood school plan in the North first
86Note, Segregaton Litigation it the 1960's: Is There an Affirtmive Dutay to Integrata tho
Schools?, 39 ItN. L J. 606, 609 (1964).
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took the form of lawsuits against the local school boards for intention-
ally maintaining segregated systems, and in other cases school boards
were found to have gerrymandered district lines and built facilities with
the intent to perpetrate racial separation. 7  These situations were ruled
unconstitutional under Brown.
Gerrymandering cases have indicated that racial imbalance in itself
is a sufficient basis for court action. In Taylor v. Board of Education
of New Rochelle,38 the plaintiffs charged that Lincoln School had been
deliberately created and maintained in a racially segregated manner in
violation of equal protection. The legal question that arises in these
cases is whether the boards have an obligation to correct the segregated
schools which result from de facto segregation. The boards would have
to correct the situation if the fourteenth amendment forbids the main-
tenance of de facto segregation as well as de jure segregation.
The opinion in Brown may be interpreted to apply to de facto as
well as to de jure segregation. This position holds all segregated educa-
tion to be unequal and since de facto segregation is maintained and
tacitly consented to by the state, its maintenance is a violation of the
fourteenth amendment. Brown holds that the educational defects of seg-
regated schooling when brought about by the compulsion of the state are
a violation of equal protection. It is possible that an area that presently
has segregated housing exists because of the enforcement of a former
law allowing segregation. This could be considered as segregation en-
forced by state action. If it were considered so, the board might be
obligated to correct it. This position was rejected in Bell v. School City
of Gary.9 In the trial court the plaintiffs asked if they had "a constitu-
tional right to attend racially integrated schools and the defendant [had]
a constitutional duty to provide and maintain a racially integrated
school system." 40 The trial court determined that Brown only prohibited
a positive policy of segregation and this was affirmed by the Court of Ap-
peals. The plaintiffs were unable to overcome the fact that Brown re-
quired non-racial assignment of pupils, and that dassification by geogra-
phy is nonracial. The case leads to the conclusion that where school
boards purposely separate the races this constitutes an unconstitutional
discriminatory policy but where there is no intentional separation of the
races, there is no constitutional violation. In Blocker v. Board of Educa-
tion of .Manhasset,4 an area became segregated over a period of time
and the district school lines that were established in 1929 were never
3 7 Branche v. Board of Education, 204 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1962); Taylor v. Board of
Education, 294 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1961).
88 195 . Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
39 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963).
40 213 F. Supp. 819, 820 (N.D. Ind. 1963).
41226 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
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altered. But the court did not hold that racial imbalance alone was un-
constitutional. The case did hold that where a school board holds to a
neighborhood school plan that remains unchanged and the area grad-
ually produces a segregated school system, that the school board has
acted in an unconstitutional manner.42
In Balaban v. Rubin,43 the court questioned the legality of consider-
ing race as a criterion in order to equalize the ratio in school districts. The
court held that the board of education could consider the question of
race when zoning school districts and that in doing so, no constitutional
rights were violated. This court rejected the position that there is a
constitutional obligation to eliminate all racial imbalance by saying "[tlhe
Constitution does not require integration."44  But the court did indicate
that in some situations there is an obligation to prevent de facto segrega-
tion. It stated that there is a
... dear mandate to the Boards of Education, in selecting the site for a
new school and establishing its attendance zone, to act affirmatively in
a manner which will prevent de facto segregation in such new school.45
The argument usually advanced in the de facto segregation cases
employs the type of reasoning used in Shelley v. Kraemer:4' that racially
segregated neighborhoods are the result of private discrimination and that
when the state requires students to attend these racially imbalanced
schools, then the ensuing harm results because of the board's failure to
remedy the situation
But the plaintiffs in Brown argued that they were receiving differ-
ential treatment solely because of their race and therefore the state en-
forced racial classification for schools was arbitrary. But the argument
can be made that Negro students are not treated differently from other
students when they are required to attend a neighborhood school be-
cause all pupils regardless of their race are required to attend these
neighborhood schools. The neighborhood school plan is not arbitrary
because it is independent of racial considerations, and so there would be
no legal injury in neighborhood racially imbalanced schools in the sense
of differential or arbitrary treatment. The policy considerations for
the neighborhood school plan are 'independent of the racial composition
of schools, therefore a neighborhood school does not imply a state sanc-
tion of separation of the races. The neighborhood school policy is not
421 d. at 230.
48 248 N.Y.S.2d 574 (1964).
44 Id. at 581.
45 Id. at 583. This position is in accord with Jackson v. Pasadena City School District, 59
Cal. 2d 876, 382 P.2d 878 (1963).
46 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
47 Sedler, School Segregatiot; in the North and West: Legal Aspects, 7 ST. LOUIs U. L J.
228, 230 n.14 (1962-63).
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discriminatory in the absence of intentional segregation. This type of
argument was used by the court in Bell v. School City of Gary.4" The
court applied the principle that the neighborhood school policy was per-
missible as long as there was a rational relationship between what the
school board did and the legal end to be achieved.
I have seen nothing in the many cases dealing with the segregation prob-
lem which leads me to believe that the law requires that a school sys-
tem developed on the neighborhood school plan, honestly and conscien-
teously constructed with no intention or purpose to segregate the races,
must be destroyed or abandoned because the resulting effect is to have
a racial imbalance in certain schools where the district is populated almost
entirely by Negroes or whites.49
But the discrimination in jobs and housing had driven the Negro into
ghettos and the application of the neighborhood school policy compels
their children by law to attend the slum schools in the neighborhood.
This fact alone, i.e. the legal compulsion to attend the segregated school,
should be sufficient state action to bring de facto segregation within the
rule of Brown.
But if school boards undertake to alleviate racial imbalance, may
they take criteria of race into consideration? To relieve racial imbalance
there is no alternative but to take race into consideration. But Brown
does say that classification on the basis of race violates the equal protection
clause.r0 The language of Brown 'relates to invidious recognition of race
for purposes of discrimination. There is nothing in Brown which sug-
gests that recognition of race to relieve an inequality violates the four-
teenth amendment.
In determining a violation of equal protection in this area of the law,
one ought to consider if, in a de facto segregated area, there is equal
educational opportunity. Where there is segregation that causes unequal
educational opportunity, then the system should be constitutionally sus-
pect. Since segregation in the public schools and unequal educational
opportunity coincider 1 the state appears to have the affirmative obliga-
tion to eliminate segregation, however it arises.
In Barksdale v. Springfield School Committee,"' the court held that
a state may be required to relieve racial imbalance in its public schools.
The court held that there was no difference between coerced and de
facto segregation and that if the neighborhood school policy results in
segregation, then it must be abandoned or modified. This case does not
48 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963).
49 Id. at 213.
50 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
51 See, 347 U.S. 483, 494 & n.ll (1954). This is expert social and psychological testimony
showing the damage done to students who went to racially segregated schools.
52237 . Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1965).
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determine at what point the unequal opportunity inherent in racial im-
balance and in de facto segregation rises to constitutional dimensions.
A judgment must be made in each case based on the substantiality of
the imbalance under the particular circumstances. Once substantial racial
imbalance is shown . . . no further proof of unequal educational oppor-
tunity is required. .... Numbers alone do not provide the answer ...
... The determination as to substantial racial imbalance, and there-
fore unequal educational opportunity, is dearly within the competence of
the judiciary . .. [T]he guidelines will have to be staked out on a
case-by-case basis.53
V. CONCLUSION
Equal educational opportunity is not the only demand of the Negro
revolution of the 1960's, but it is the most important one. Without it the
Negro will continue to be tied to the segregated slum where he will con-
tinue to suffer from social and educational stagnation. One of the ob-
jectives of public education is to provide the individual with the oppor-
tunity to develop his abilities to the fullest extent. This is being fore-
stalled in de facto segregated schools. The consequence of racial segrega-
tion is alienation from the society. The integrated school is the first
step in providing an equal education for Negro children and especially
for the generations of Negro children to come.
Robert A. Retske
53 Wright, Public School Desegregation: Legal Remedies for De Facto Segregation, 16
W. REs. L Ruv. 478, 495-96 (1964-65).
